IRBlock

Longitudinal measurement of Internet censorship in Iran, observed from outside

Is a domain blocked in Iran?

Checks the domain against the blocking rules we infer from crafted-probe scans of Iran's censorship system (GFI). Each result shows which mechanisms carry a rule and the share of scanning batches in which it was triggered.

How to read a result

rule on domain means the GFI carries a rule anchored on exactly the domain you typed. via a rule on parent domain means the rule is anchored on a parent and its shape also matches what you typed, which is how entire platforms such as blogspot.com or wordpress.com get swept up by a single rule. A mechanism can show both, when a domain carries its own rule and is covered by a parent's as well.

Mechanism

Colour identifies the censorship mechanism, not the strength of the finding:

  • DNS injection forged DNS answers
  • HTTP block-page injection injected "403 Forbidden" page
  • HTTPS (TCP RST injection) forged TCP reset triggered by the TLS SNI

Coverage and period

Triggered in N% of scanning batches is the share of our scans of that mechanism in which the rule fired. A low share is not a weaker measurement, and the months bound the batches this snapshot draws on rather than the life of the block.

More in the Q&A: what the share and the months mean, how a rule's shape is inferred and why it can change, why a domain may be missing from this index, and why we publish months rather than exact scan dates.

These figures are a lower bound on censorship: we measure from outside Iran, so anything our probes cannot reach is missing rather than absent. See Q&A for what these measurements do and do not show.